The age old question ...

When the Toronto Blue Jays exceed my expectations -- I had them good for 82 wins -- you know they've had a successful season. Just like that, the offseason is upon us, but what a season it was. I could go on and on: Jose Bautista's meaningful at-bats, and his assault on Toronto's, and baseball's, record books; the promising development of Toronto's top-four starting pitchers, with Kyle Drabek set to join them in 2011; the triumphant return of Vernon Wells; more, and quite possibly for the last time, yeomen's work from Scott Downs; home run after home run after home run after home run after home run; and, finally, Cito Gaston's farewell.

The polarizing Mike Wilner may have put it best, though:

"It was a tremendously fun year. We got to see one of the greatest games ever pitched, we got to see the greatest offensive season a Blue Jay has ever had, we got to see the greatest major-league debut any hitter has ever had, we got to see the Jays tie one league record with six doubles in an inning and another with six homers in a loss and we got to bite our fingernails as a Blue Jay starting pitcher took a no-hitter into the 7th inning an astounding FIVE times! Heck, we even got to go through the Nick Green era - remember that?"

I don't remember the Nick Green era, which is probably for the best. But Wilner's right: it was definitely a fun summer. And it wasn't supposed to be. That was the best part.

Let's not kid ourselves, though. It wasn't all double rainbows. Aaron Hill and Adam Lind did their best to kill my baseball buzz for six months, and before we look forward, we'll look back.

What comes first: patience at the plate, or confidence at the plate? Does confidence breed patience? Or is it the other way around? Without confidence, is patience in the batter's box impossible? Without patience, is confidence, and success, impossible? What the hell am I talking about here? What I'm trying to figure out is: How do two young, promising hitters go from being so successful to -- for one season at least -- below average Major League hitters?

To FanGraphs, yo. Let's start with Hill, and some of his year-over-year numbers, after he unfathomably spent most of 2010 flirting with the goddamn Mendoza Line.

O-Swing% -- the percentage of pitches a batter swings at outside the strike zone:

2010: 31.3%
2009: 26.5%

A five percent increase in Hill swinging at pitches outside the strike zone. The money stat? Perhaps. 

Z-Swing% -- the percentage of pitches a batter swings at inside the strike zone:

2010: 72.1%
2009: 74.2%

So, Hill swung at fewer pitches inside the strike zone, and more pitches outside the strike zone, compared to 2009, his breakout season. This season, he looked lost. From the get go. More often than not. These numbers make sense.

Swing% -- the total percentage of pitches a batter swings at:

2010: 50.7%
2009: 51.1%

A negligible difference. Does it come down to confidence, and approach? Swinging at the wrong pitches?

O-Contact% -- the percentage of times a batter makes contact with the ball when swinging at pitches thrown outside the strike zone:

2010: 70.9%
2009: 60.8%

A huge 10% increase here year-over-year. Not only was Hill swinging at more baseballs thrown outside the strike zone, he was hitting more of them. And unless you're Vladimir Guerrero, more often than not, those are outs.

Z-Contact% -- the percentage of times a batter makes contact with the ball when swinging at pitches thrown inside the strike zone:

2010: 90.9%
2009: 91.4%

Again, year-over-year, that's hardly a noteworthy difference. So, is this a good time to bring in baseball's luck factor, and Hill's feeble .196 2010 BABIP? I would think so.

Contact% -- the total percentage of contact made when swinging at all pitches:

2010: 84.5%
2009: 83.8%

Hill's career Contact% average is 84.5%.

Zone% -- the percentage of pitches seen inside the strike zone:

2010: 47.6%
2009: 51.7%

Does a confident and patient hitter take more pitches in the strike zone? I'm so confused.

Let's take at look Hill's left/right splits:

2010 vs. LHP (120 ABs): .125/.226/.225, .124 BABIP, .206 wOBA, 22 wRC+
2009 vs. LHP: (171 ABs): .298/.335/.561, .290 BABIP, .379 wOBA, 134 wRC+

2010 vs. RHP (408 ABs): .228/.285/.444, .217 BABIP, .318 wOBA, 98 wRC+
2009 vs. RHP (511 ABs): .282/.328/.478, .287 BABIP, .348 wOBA, 114 wRC+

Hill didn't have a clue versus left-handed pitching this season, after owning southpaws in 2009. Against right-handed pitching, I don't see why Hill can't be expected to put up his 2009 numbers every year. Slightly above average numbers against RHP, and above average against LHP is what Hill certainly seems capable of.

But, again, luck. Hill's .286 BABIP in 2009 was below average, but 36 home runs certainly helped in putting up a .357 wOBA, and 119 wRC+. This season, as mentioned, Hill's BABIP checked in at a putrid .196. His fly ball rate jumped to 54.2%, compared to 41% in 2009. Yet he still finished with 26 home runs. My question: How do we account for the increased fly ball rate? 

Below is how Hill's season began in 2010. Remember, he hit the disabled list two games into the campaign.

April 2010 (37 ABs): .162/.311/.297, .179 BABIP, .277 wOBA, 90 wRC+
May 2010 (114 ABs): .184/.273/.395, .161 BABIP, .298 wOBA, 85 wRC+

And here are Hill's numbers over the first two months of 2009:

April 2009 (104 ABs): .365/.412/.567, .384 BABIP, .419 wOBA, 161 wRC+
May 2009 (127 ABs): .307/.331/.480, .314 BABIP, .352 wOBA, 116 wRC+

Polar opposite starts to Hill's seasons. In 2009, he could do no wrong, as evidenced by his .384 BABIP. It certainly did even out, and by year's end it was below the league average. So, my question is, how much value do you put into a hot start? After two months of hitting the cover off the ball in April and May 2009, Hill's confidence had to have been sky-high. And after his pathetic, and unlucky, first two months of the 2010 season, Hill probably never felt worse about his hitting prospects. Not to mention the injury.

Did pitchers figure Aaron Hill out? Or was he unable to work through the cobwebs in his own head? How much of a hitter's success at the plate comes from being "locked in"? From a hot start, and not holding the bat too tight, and not trying to do too much? What comes first? Patience or confidence?

Do you know? Are you as confused as I am? Help a brother out.

Either way, we're going to find out next season. Personally, I can't wait. Toronto's first Spring Training game is only five months away.

I'll tackle Adam Lind in another post. My head hurts, yo.

Reuters, via daylife, hooked up the image of one frustrated Aaron Hill.

Locking Up Ricky

The Toronto Blue Jays believe in Ricky Romero. So much so that they rewarded him with the largest contract in history -- five years, $30.1 million -- for a pitcher with less than two years of Major League service time to his name. And you know what? I'm totally fine with that. Actually: I'm more than fine with it; I love the decision. Because like the braintrust, I too believe in Ricky Romero.

Here's the breakdown of the deal, courtesy of the always reliable MLB Trade Rumours:

2010: $1.25 million bonus

2011: $750,000

2012: $5 million

2013 - 2015: $7.5 million

2016: $13 million club option ($600,000 buyout)

When Romero was the first pitcher chosen in the 2005 draft, 6th overall by the J.P. Ricciardi regime, here's what the then 20-year-old had to say: "I love competing. I love getting the ball in big games ... I have a lot of confidence that I can get the job done. That's just the type of competitor I've been."

And Romero wasn't lying. Because they said he was a bust; they said he'd never make it.

Five years later, and a year and a half into his pro career, they were dead wrong, and Romero has come as advertised; he's a fiery competitor. It was Ricciardi who in September of last year famously said: "You need a wheelbarrow to take his balls to the mound. That's how big they are."

Do yourself a favour and read that post linked above, from The Tao of Stieb. Almost three months ago to the day, The Ack wrote of Romero's development; he even called him "The Man," which Ricky most certainly is from this day forward.

Think about it: the Toronto Blue Jays went into the 2010 campaign with four young starters at the top of their rotation who are making, in baseball salaries, pennies:

Ricky Romero: $408,300

Shaun Marcum: $850,000

Brett Cecil: $400,000

Brandon Morrow: $409,800

Here's what they're worth, in terms of WAR (Wins Above Replacement):

Romero: 3.4

Morrow: 3.1

Marcum: 2.3

Cecil: 2.3

I've already spent far too much time on FanGraphs, so I'm just going to go ahead and assume that there is no more cost-effective rotation in baseball than Toronto's. There can't be. And Romero's leading the way. As amazing as that above quote from Ricciardi will always remain, it's clear there's more to #24 than just his cojones. There is the business that is his devastating changeup. The pitch he throws when he's got two strikes against a batter; the pitch the batter should know is coming. Below are the counts when Romero gets ahead, the batter at his mercy, and the percentage of time he unleashes his changeup:

0-2/35%

1-2/38%

2-2/47%

3-2/37%

It's his out pitch. Only when the count runs full does Romero turn to his fastball (44%) more than his changeup, as he probably should. And what he's doing is working. The batter, if he's done his homework, is thinking off-speed; he just can't hit it. Below are Romero's opponents' batting averages in those same counts:

0-2: .143

After 0-2: .125

1-2: .122

After 1-2: .150

2-2: .160

After 2-2: .165

3-2: .188

After 3-2: .188

Romero's a stone-cold killer. More often than not, he will put you away.

What's made RickRo so effective this season has been the improvement in his fastball, and his ability to throw five above-average pitches, something he wasn't able to do in 2009. According to Fangraphs' Pitch Type Values, Romero's fastball last year was 11.8 runs below average. His slider: 2.1 runs below average. Here's how what he's tossing in 2010 has fared:

Fastball: 7.4 runs above average

Slider: 3.0 runs above average

Cutter: 0.2 runs above average

Curveball: 3.2 runs above average

Changeup: 3.9 runs above average

Romero's changeup hasn't been as effective as it was last season (9.8 runs above average). But he's a more well-rounded pitcher in spite of the fact. He's getting better. And he's only 25.

There's more: Romero's ground ball to fly ball ratio (GB/FB). In 178 career innings pitched since bursting onto the scene a year ago, it's an immaculate 2.01; Halladay-esque. His 2010 GB/FB ratio of 1.99 is third-highest in the American League. And if Romero isn't allowing fly balls, he's not allowing home runs. His 2010 home run to fly ball ratio (HR/FB) is 8.5%, in tune with the likes of Felix Hernandez, Zack Greinke, Jered Weaver, Jon Lester, and Phil Hughes. That's fine American League company, and RickRo is worthy.

There's more still. Because Romero is striking out more batters, walking fewer, allowing fewer hits, and becoming one of the premier ground ball pitchers in the game, his xFIP (Expected Fielding Independent Pitching) of 3.60 is among the best in the business. It ranks sixth in the AL, and those with lower numbers are: Francisco Lariano, Cliff Lee, Lester, Hernandez, and Weaver. And, yes, there are still some who have the audacity to say the Toronto Blue Jays are without an ace.

A hundred and seventy-eight innings. Enough to have me convinced. (I've been convinced for a while.) And at an average of $6 million a season, with $7.5 million being the most Romero takes home in any given year of the new deal, numbers that are "fair to both sides," enough to have the Blue Jays convinced, too.

Ricky got paid. Rightfully so. Your Troy Tulowitzki references are no longer of any use.

Finally, one last quote I'd like to share with you. It's from that fateful day in June way back in 2005, when Romero became a Blue Jay ...

"We figured we would lean more toward the pitching ... The more pitching we can develop the better off we're going to be."

- J.P. Ricciardi

Ricciardi was right. #TeamRomero.